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In the spring of  1975, with the next presidential election quickly 
approaching, Gerald Ford’s administration began to feel pressure from 
both ends of  the political spectrum to define its stance on gun control 
legislation. With violence – particularly gun violence – on the rise, Ford 
realized he needed to lead an effort to create new gun laws in order to curb 
the increasing crime rate. As the Treasury Department explained that April, 
“recent estimates place the number of  handguns in America at about 40 
million while deaths by handguns have increased almost 50 percent in the 
last decade.”1 Cheap, small, and easily concealable handguns, nicknamed 
Saturday Night Specials, were a major reason why “the rate of  serious crime 
increased faster in 1974 than in any year since the FBI started keeping 
statistics.”2 On May 22, 1975, Jim Cannon, a chief  advisor to President 
Ford, wrote to the President to explain that from a study of  4,537 handguns 
used in violent crimes in four major cities in 1974, seventy percent of  the 
handguns used were Saturday Night Specials.3 In order to combat this rate 
of  violence, the Ford Administration proposed several different solutions 
to the problem. In the midst of  the upcoming 1976 presidential election, 
pressure from the increasingly powerful and conservative National Rifle 
Association (NRA), and advocacy from both conservative and liberal 
Americans and members of  Congress, President Ford sought to find 
middle ground in the gun control debate.  
The time period of  the early to mid-1970s is paramount to 
understanding the full history of  the debate over gun control legislation 
1 Statement of  David R. MacDonald before the Subcommittee to Investigate 
Juvenile Delinquency, April 23, 1975, Box 3, Folder 25: Crime, O’Donnell and 
Jenckes Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library. 
2 Memorandum to the President from Jim Cannon, May 22, 1975, Box 9, Folder 
100: Crime, Message to Congress (1), Philip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library. 
3 Ibid.
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in America. President Ford had inherited a Presidency tainted by the 
Watergate Scandal, which he only amplified by quickly pardoning Richard 
Nixon. Meanwhile, a Democratic Congress interested in retaking the White 
House pressured him from the left while Ronald Reagan and a recovering 
conservative movement pressured him from the right.4 Ford himself  was 
a moderate Republican faced with a quickly rising crime rate that had 
guns as the common denominator. Therefore, President Ford needed to 
act effectively with both sides of  the political spectrum to please as many 
people as possible on the issue of  gun control in order to curb the crime 
rate, gain political allies, and win the next presidential election. Throughout 
1975, the Ford Administration conducted a copious amount of  research to 
gauge both the public and politicians’ stances on new gun control policies. 
Furthermore, it analyzed the best ways to reduce gun violence through a 
middle-of-the-road approach. But by 1976, the bill the Ford Administration 
put forth to try to end violent crime committed with Saturday Night 
Specials failed in Congress. A similar bill proposed by the House also did 
not get signed into law. These legislative defeats signified the changing tides 
within Washington with regard to gun control that effectively ended the 
progress that was made with the 1968 Gun Control Act. 
There exists a significant gap in historical literature on gun laws 
in the United States between the 1968 Gun Control Act and the 1977 
Revolt in Cincinnati, where the NRA transformed itself  from a hunting 
organization into a fierce Second-Amendment-defending lobbying firm. 
Many scholars fail to adequately assess the intervening years between these 
two events, and as such fail to illustrate how the debate over Saturday 
Night Specials during Ford’s Presidency irrevocably altered gun control 
legislation. For instance, in Michael Waldman’s historical account on the 
interpretation of  the Second Amendment and gun control, The Second 
Amendment: A Biography, he denotes only a short paragraph to the debate on 
Saturday Night Specials and its impact.5 While he is correct in explaining 
that support for a Saturday Night Specials ban by factions of  the NRA “set 
in motion forces that would supplant that grinning hunter in the NRA’s 
pantheon of  acceptable images,”6 which the Revolt in Cincinnati finalized, 
his brief  mention of  this debate within the NRA and throughout the 
United States can be extrapolated to further develop the historical narrative 
of  gun control and how it has affected present day politics. Waldman is not 
alone in this omission, as multiple authors on the subject of  the history of  
gun control have also neglected to highlight the importance of  the debate 
4 Letter to President Ford from Max Friedersdorf, June 19, 1975, Box 11, Folder 10: 
Crime and Gun Control, Max Friedersdorf  Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
5 Waldman, Michael. The Second Amendment: A Biography (Simon and Schuster, 2014), 
92.
6 Ibid.
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over gun legislation in the earlier 1970s and its consequences.7,8 
This essay aims to better develop this history by analyzing the 
shortcomings of  the Ford Administration and how the debate over 
Saturday Night Specials during Ford’s presidency ended an era of  hope 
for gun control proponents and sparked a conservative coalition that has 
dominated the debate through the present day. President Ford’s misguided 
ambition to keep the middle road in this debate to try to satisfy both 
liberals and conservatives prevented any legislative progress in federally 
restricting the sale of  Saturday Night Specials. Furthermore, the success the 
gun lobby enjoyed from President Ford’s failure solidified the initiative of  
significant factions of  the NRA to transform itself  into the main defender 
of  the Second Amendment in national politics. Without the defeats of  the 
Ford Administration and other liberal and moderate proponents of  ending 
the sale and manufacture of  Saturday Night Specials, the progressive spirit 
that the 1968 Gun Control Act instilled in American politics towards gun 
legislation would not have collapsed.  
Background Politics and the State of  Public Opinion
In the mid-1970s, the discussion of  gun control was as divisive 
and impassioned as it is today. The main gun control law in place at the 
time was the 1968 Gun Control Act, enacted by Congress on October 22, 
1968, after the deaths of  President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.9,10 The 1968 Act banned mail-order purchasing of  guns 
except antiques, mandated licensing of  individuals and businesses who 
partook in the selling of  firearms, and made inter-state trade of  firearms 
more difficult.11 At the time of  the passage of  the 1968 Gun Control Act, 
the Vice-President of  the National Rifle Association, Franklin Orth, stated 
about the law’s ban on mail-order guns, “We do not think that any sane 
American, who calls himself  an American, can object to placing into this 
bill the instrument which killed the President [Kennedy] of  the United 
States.”12 Only six years later, however, the NRA would come to regret 
its stance on the Act and would be an ardent opponent to any further 
legislation promoting gun control. Furthermore, by the mid-1970s, the 1968 
Act proved to not be enough to stop violent crime committed with guns, 
7 Winkler, Adam. Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011), 253.
8 Spitzer, Robert. The Politics of  Gun Control (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 
1995), 113-126.
9 1968 Gun Control Act Text. U.S. Government Publishing Office. http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-82/pdf/STATUTE-82-Pg1213-2.pdf
10 Waldman, The Second Amendment, 83.
11 1968 Gun Control Act Text. U.S. Government Publishing Office. http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-82/pdf/STATUTE-82-Pg1213-2.pdf
12 Waldman, The Second Amendment, 88-89.
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specifically Saturday Night Specials, and its shortcomings opened the door 
for an entirely new debate on gun control legislation.
Ken Cole, Assistant to President Ford on Domestic Affairs, 
outlined in a memorandum to the new President in late 1974 the history 
of  gun control legislation during the 1960s and under President Nixon. He 
explained in regards to the 1968 Act, “public support for some sort of  gun 
control touched eighty percent;” therefore, “the gun lobby was unable to 
stop the passage of  the Act.”13 The gun lobby, however, was able to water 
the Act down by making it only “purport to establish minimum Federal 
requirements for gun ownership because the only Federal requirement of  
a dealer prior to sale is that he ask the intended buyer if  he fits any of  the 
outlawed categories.”14 This was an extremely soft alternative to registration 
and licensing of  all gun owners. Therefore, the 1968 Gun Control Act had 
virtually no effect on gun sales or violent crimes involving guns.15 
 On August 9, 1972, Senator Roman Hruska, a staunch 
conservative, and Senator Evan Bayh, a Democrat, introduced a bill to 
better regulate Saturday Night Specials; it passed the Senate by a vote of  
sixty-eight to twenty-five.16 The bill sought to apply the same standards 
to domestically-made Saturday Night Specials that had been applied to 
foreign-made ones since the passage of  the 1968 Gun Control Act.17 
However, by the time the bill came to the House of  Representatives, “the 
election season was too close at hand and not only did it never get reported 
from Committee, Senators stopped calling for its passage, and [the Nixon 
Administration] worked quietly to oppose it.”18 Therefore, by 1975, the 
issue of  Saturday Night Specials still had not been properly addressed.
 Indeed, the issue of  Saturday Night Specials became an increasingly 
pressing problem, and one that attracted intense opinions from all sectors 
of  the American public. By 1975, Gerald Ford received hundreds of  letters 
from concerned citizens on both ends of  the debate on Saturday Night 
Specials. The authors of  many of  the letters included gun rights advocates 
13 Memorandum to the President from Kenneth Cole on Firearms, September 
6, 1974, Box 26, Folder: Judicial and Legal Matters- Crime (1), Presidential 
Handwriting File, Ford Presidential Library.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Text of  Bayh-Hruska Bill, Pro-Quest Congressional, http://congressional.
proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview
?accountid=14667&groupid=95663&pgId=43ea48f6-1a25-4158-8544-
ef8aa8bcadc7&rsId=1507E6BD87B
17 Ibid.
18 Memorandum to the President from Kenneth Cole on Firearms, September 
6, 1974, Box 26, Folder: Judicial and Legal Matters- Crime (1), Presidential 
Handwriting File, Ford Presidential Library.
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and even school children from Grand Rapids, Michigan.19,20 The messages 
in these letters made it clear that the debate over gun control did not 
break down by generational or regional lines.21 In one of  the oddest letters 
President Ford received, a Reverend named Darwyn Hassert advised him 
of  the Biblical message of  the right to bear firearms. The Reverend wrote, 
“What most Americans do not know is that the Second Amendment to 
the Constitution is explicitly taught in the Word of  God. Notice Luke 
22:35-38.”22 From these letters, it became evident quickly to the Ford 
administration that Saturday Night Specials and gun control in general were 
a divisive topic for Americans and would become a focal issue for him to 
act on if  he wanted to win the next presidential election.
 On June 5, 1975, a Gallup Poll reported that the “public 
overwhelmingly [favored] registration of  all firearms.”23 Based on two 
nationwide surveys of  adults, interviewed in person in more than three 
hundred localities, sixty-seven percent of  the nation favored registration 
of  all firearms, which was, as the poll explained, “consistent with Gallup 
surveys over the last three decades, which [had] shown similar majorities 
supporting such legislation.”24 More dramatically, “a majority of  persons 
living in high crime areas – large cities and in the East – would go so far as 
to ban the possession of  handguns by anyone except the police or other 
authorized persons.”25 But outside of  high crime areas, the East and the 
nation’s largest cities, the Gallup Poll explained, “all major groups oppose 
the banning of  handguns, with two exceptions; among women and persons 
with a college background, opinion is closely divided.”26 Fifty-four percent 
of  non-gun owners also agreed that there should be a law forbidding 
possession of  handguns.27 Lastly, the poll showed that six in ten households 
did not own a gun.28 This poll highlighted the fact that the debate over gun 
control was both a divisive and a significant issue to many Americans. The 
federal government therefore had the task of  constructing legislation that 
would solve the tangible issue of  violence while simultaneously maintaining 
the support of  this fractured opinion shift.
19 Letters to President Ford, Box B80, Folder 35: Gun Control, President Ford 
Committee Campaign records, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Letter to President Ford from Reverend Darwyn Hassert, October 9, 1973, Box 
15, Folder 50: Firearms, Gerald R Ford Vice Presidential Papers, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library.
23 Gallup Poll, June 5, 1975, Box 9, Folder 450: Crime (1), James M. Cannon Files, 
Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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 Up until this point, Congress had enacted few laws intended 
to regulate Saturday Night Specials and the possession of  other guns. 
As Phil Buchen, a member of  the White House Counsel, explained in a 
memorandum to Ken Lazarus, the Assistant Counsel to President Ford, 
federal gun control laws “banned importation of  ‘Saturday Night Specials’ 
under a set of  defining standards.”29 Furthermore, “manufacturers [had to] 
place a serial number on each weapon” and “keep a journal of  the identities 
of  buyers of  their weapons.”30 In addition, retailers were not allowed to 
knowingly sell firearms to “youths, non-residents of  the dealer’s state and 
other proscribed categories of  purchasers – convicted felons, persons 
under indictment, mental defectives, drug users, certain aliens, and persons 
who have renounced their citizenship.”31 Any person who used a firearm 
to commit any federal felony received an additional one to ten years on 
their prison sentence.32 A second conviction under the provision carried a 
mandatory minimum sentence of  two years and prohibited any judge from 
suspending the sentence or placing the defendant on probation.33 
Despite the various gun laws in the books before 1975, these 
regulations had substantial loopholes that led to controversies under 
the Ford administration. First of  all, as Ken Lazarus explained in a 
memorandum to Phil Buchen on June 3, 1975, “federal dealer licenses 
[could] be obtained by persons who [were] not bona-fide dealers in 
weapons.”34 Furthermore, it was difficult for the government to determine 
if  the dealer “knowingly sold a weapon to a member of  one of  the 
prohibited classes of  persons.”35 Third, “there [was] little control on 
sales of  weapons after the first sale by a dealer.”36 Lastly, and in regards 
to Saturday Night Specials specifically, current law prohibited the 
importation of  assembled Saturday Night Specials, but it did not prohibit 
“the importation of  their parts for assembly domestically.”37 According 
to the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) in 1975, there 
was a serious “absence of  an effective statutory means to prosecute and 
punish felons and other dangerous persons for the possession and use 
29 Memorandum to Ken Lazarus from Phil Buchen, June 3, 1975, Box 9, Folder 
100: Crime Message to Congress (2), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library. 
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Memorandum to Phil Buchen from Ken Lazarus, June 3, 1975, Box 9, Folder 
100: Crime Message to Congress (2), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library. 
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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of  firearms”38 because “due to the sheer magnitude of  the number of  
licensees, it [was] impossible for the ATF to monitor each licensee and it 
[was] becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a meaningful and effective 
compliance program based upon even random or periodic inspections.”39 
Therefore, the need for a re-evaluation of  current law became preeminent 
for the Ford Administration and other federal powers in order to more 
effectively prosecute people who broke gun laws.
The Executive Branch Outlines Plans of  Legislation
In the spring of  1975, several federal bureaus started the process 
of  proposing a middle ground in the gun control debate that would curb 
the violence but also maintain conservative support. Attorney General 
Edward H. Levi gave a speech to the International Association of  Chiefs 
of  Police on April 6, 1975, in order to outline his department’s proposal to 
stop the manufacture and sale of  Saturday Night Specials.40 The proposal 
set forth would “apply only in heavily populated metropolitan areas” and 
would “apply only when the violent crime rate in the metropolitan area 
either [exceeded] the national violent crime rate by a specified percentage 
or [increased] a specified amount in a single year.”41 When this threshold 
was reached, possession of  handguns outside of  one’s home or business 
as well as the sale or transfer of  handguns and handgun ammunition 
would be prohibited.42 Additionally, the law outlawed the importation of  
handguns into metropolitan areas.43 The prohibitions under the new law, 
however, would not apply to law enforcement officers and other narrowly 
defined security personnel.44  In terms of  criminal penalties for violations 
of  the proposed law, the Attorney General explained, “we have been 
thinking about using a civil penalty for a first offense and criminal penalties 
for subsequent offenses.”45 Furthermore, in order to avoid “stop-and-go 
enforcement,” the Attorney General’s department thought that once the 
new federal law went into effect in the designated metropolitan area “it 
ought to stay in effect for a period of  several years.”46 Edward Levi closed 
his proposal by remarking, “I state that the entire idea ‘could be dropped, 
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Letter from Edward Levi to Phillip Buchen, March 31, 1975, Box 18, Folder 150: 
Gun Control (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library. 
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Letter from Edward Levi to Phillip Buchen, March 31, 1975, Box 18, Folder 150: 
Gun Control (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
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and it may be dropped.’ But I do hope the balloon will fly.”47 
The gun lobby and its supporters did not hesitate to denounce 
both the Ford Administration as a whole and Edward Levi specifically after 
the Attorney General announced his proposal. Only four days after Levi’s 
speech, Senator James A. McClure, a Republican from Idaho, wrote to 
President Ford to outline his opposition to the proposal. McClure called the 
proposal, “nothing less than a declaration of  war on the right of  Americans 
to keep and bear arms.”48 He needed to know if  “the views of  Mr. Levi, 
either in his specific proposal or his general view of  the ‘universe’ of  gun 
controls, [was] the official position of  the Ford Administration”49 because 
“such an assault on the Second Amendment of  the Constitution as Mr. 
Levi’s [was] unacceptable and senseless from any quarter, but coming from 
a member of  [the Ford] administration, it [was] a gratuitous insult to those 
Americans who believe in constitutional guarantees.”50 In closing his letter 
to President Ford, Senator McClure exclaimed: 
In his remarks Mr. Levi says his own proposals – proposals 
involving what I among tens of  millions of  Americans see 
as police-state restrictions – ‘are only a small part of  the 
universe of  social inventions we could design to stem the 
spread of  firearms.’ That is, at the very least, a terrifying 
admission. What if  Mr. Levi had said, ‘limited censorship 
of  newspapers and television is only a small part of  the 
universe of  social inventions we could design to stem the 
spread of  free speech?’51 
Conservatives were not the only ones to take issue with Levi’s 
gun control proposal. His department as well as the Ford Administration 
received strong criticism from gun control proponents who felt 
the proposal did not go far enough. On July 1, 1975, United States 
Representative Abner J. Mikva, a Democrat from Illinois, wrote a strongly 
opinioned article about his view on Levi’s plan.52 Mikva’s main problem 
with the proposed law was that it established a level of  crime at twenty 
percent above the national average that needed to be reached before the act 
47 Ibid.
48 Letter from Senator James A. McClure to President Ford, April 10, 1975, Box 
18, Folder 150: Gun Control (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford Presidential 
Library. 
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Letter from Senator James A. McClure to President Ford, April 10, 1975, Box 
18, Folder 150: Gun Control (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford Presidential 
Library.
52 Newspaper article, “Handguns: We Must Begin to Dry Up the Supply” by Abner 
J. Mikva, July 1, 1975, Box 9, Folder 450: Crime (1), James M. Cannon Files, Gerald 
Ford Presidential Library. 
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could take effect. Therefore, if  a city had a crime rate of  nineteen percent 
above the national average, the law would not do anything, and then, when 
the level of  crime hit twenty percent, the law would be in effect until it went 
back down to nineteen percent.53 Furthermore, Mikva took issue with laws 
that only targeted the cheap and easily concealable Saturday Night Specials 
instead of  all handguns.54 In order to tie both of  these dilemmas together, 
Mikva stated, “there is no solace for a victim or his family in the knowledge 
that a bullet came from an expensive ‘Sunday through Friday’ handgun 
rather than a cheap handgun. And there will be no solace either in the 
knowledge that a deadly bullet found its mark when the crime rate was at 
‘acceptable levels.’”55 Lastly, Mikva saw it ineffective to ban handguns in one 
area, specifically metropolitan areas, but allow them to be legal in another 
close by because of  the many ways guns could then be transported into the 
cities.56 In conclusion of  his article, Mikva declared, “we must begin to dry 
up the supply of  handguns and give back the streets of  this country to law-
abiding people. To do that, we must have a ban on the manufacture and sale 
of  all handguns.”57 
Although the Attorney General faced serious opposition to his 
proposed law on Saturday Night Specials, his department was not alone 
in trying to find a solution for the gun violence in America. The Treasury 
Department, too, wanted to use its power in interstate commerce as a 
means to be involved in the process of  reversing the rising rate of  gun 
violence in America. On April 23, 1975, David A. MacDonald, the Assistant 
Secretary for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff  Affairs of  the Treasury, 
gave a statement on his department’s proposed firearm legislation before 
the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. At the time, 
not only was gun violence an issue generally, but federal departments also 
wanted to specifically curb its destructiveness in youths. MacDonald stated 
from the beginning that “there is no doubt, in our opinion, that the easy 
availability of  handguns does contribute to the opportunity to commit 
violent crimes and thus to the frequency with which they are committed.”58 
However, “efforts at gun control legislation may address more of  a 
symptom than a cause of  juvenile delinquency. This is not to say that 
any legislation effort in this area will be fruitless.”59 Furthermore, before 
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Newspaper article, “Handguns: We Must Begin to Dry Up the Supply” by Abner 
J. Mikva, July 1, 1975, Box 9, Folder 450: Crime (1), James M. Cannon Files, Gerald 
Ford Presidential Library.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Statement of  David R. MacDonald before the Subcommittee to Investigate 
Juvenile Delinquency, April 23, 1975, Box 3, Folder 25: Crime, O’Donnell and 
Jenckes Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
59 Ibid.
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discussing their proposals, the panel stressed that what they were about to 
state had not been cleared with the White House Counsel.60  
The Treasury Department recommended a provision in the 1968 
Act that would allow the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
to inquire into each applicant’s business experience, financial standing, and 
trade connections to determine if  the license he/she was seeking would be 
used for the legitimate sale of  firearms, similar to how the ATF determined 
how a business should or should not receive an alcohol license.61 
Furthermore, it recommended restructuring the licenses so that someone 
only selling ammo could not sell guns and someone only selling rifles could 
not sell handguns.62 It also recommended raising the licensing fee so that 
only people who were truly serious about selling firearms would seek the 
license.63 Lastly, the Treasury Department proposed increasing the penalty 
for breaking the law, such as suspension of  firearms licenses and accepting 
monetary offers for violations.64 
The Treasury Department went into depth on how to better 
determine a Saturday Night Special. It recommended using the “factoring 
criteria” in the 1968 Act to determine what is defined as Saturday Night 
Special gun. As outlined by the criteria, the key characteristic would be 
overall size: no handgun failing to meet certain minimum size standards 
would be acceptable for manufacture, assembly, or importation. In the 
cases of  revolvers, a barrel length of  greater than three inches would be 
mandatory.”65 In addition, MacDonald outlined a point system, which 
“would take into account such characteristics as size, frame construction, 
weight, caliber, safety features, and miscellaneous equipment” in order 
to determine if  a gun is suitable for sale.66 In closing its proposal, the 
Treasury Department argued for a modification of  the 1968 Act “so that 
a mandatory sentencing provision would be applicable to first offenders as 
well as to recidivists,” that is to say, “a mandatory minimum sentence of  
one year, with a discretionary five-year maximum.”67 Under the current law, 
mandatory minimum sentences had only been for second-time offenders.
After the Attorney General and the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms announced their ideas, members of  the Ford Administration 
became next in line to create a comprehensive strategy to combat crime 
and gun violence. Gerald Ford made it his prerogative to tread the line 
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Statement of  David R. MacDonald before the Subcommittee to Investigate 
Juvenile Delinquency, April 23, 1975, Box 3, Folder 25: Crime, O’Donnell and 
Jenckes Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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between gun rights advocacy and the need to implement stricter laws and 
enforcement measurements in order to lower the rising crime rate. Raised 
in Western Michigan, President Ford grew up hunting, and had sympathy 
for and an understanding of  the arguments gun advocates were making 
during the debates in the 1970s. Ford was not comfortable with stronger 
stances towards gun control from its proponents, even when some in his 
administration advocated for them, as exemplified in his personal letters68 as 
well as in statements by the White House Counsel.69 Therefore, the debate 
of  what to do in regards to gun control became a stalemate in Ford’s inner 
circle during the spring of  1975, and inevitably became based on political 
motives and finding a balance to appease a wide variety of  constituents 
prior to the next presidential election.
The Ford Administration planned to deliver its first comprehensive 
proposal towards gun control on May 15, 1975, in President Ford’s crime 
message. Because the debate over gun control was so divisive outside of  
and within the Administration, however, Ford’s crime message had to be 
continually moved later and later.70 Although the Ford Administration was 
stalling in releasing its crime message, it was not doing so idly. Top political 
counselors to the President met with politicians and experts in the field 
and corresponded with other departments in order to most effectively 
draft a crime message as well as subsequent legislation that would enable 
President Ford to act tough on crime while remaining a strong supporter 
of  gun rights, thus exemplifying his image as a powerful executive leader.71 
The main priority for the Ford Administration was finding common ground 
with Congress so its proposed legislation would pass and therefore shed a 
positive light on the executive branch.
 The White House Counsel saw conservative congressmen as the 
most important people to meet with as they could potentially support 
Ford’s proposal despite typically opposing gun control legislation. 
Therefore, Ken Lazarus and Bob Wolthuis, Special Assistant to the 
President on Congressional Relations, met with six Republican Senators, 
including Jesse Helms, James McClure, Barry Goldwater, and Roman 
Hruska, as well as four Representatives in early June 1975. On June 19, 
68 Letter to Ashley Halsey from President Ford, September 14, 1976, Box 26, 
Folder: Judicial and Legal Matters- Crime (1), Presidential Handwriting File, Gerald 
Ford Presidential Library.
69 Memorandum to the President from the White House Counsel, May 22, 1975, 
Box 9, Folder 100: Crime- Message to Congress (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald 
Ford Presidential Library.
70 Memorandum to White House Counsel, Spring of  1975, Box 9, Folder 150: 
Crime-Message to Congress (1) April 29 to May 22, 1975, James M. Cannon Files, 
Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
71 Letters from Phil Buchen to Congressmen and others, May 6 and 21, 1975, Box 
18, Folder 150: Gun Control (1), Phillip W. Buchen Files, Gerald Ford Presidential 
Library. 
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1975, Max Friedersdorf  wrote  a memorandum to President Ford outlining 
the responses the counselors received about new gun control measures.72 
In regards to Saturday Night Specials specifically, Friedersdorf  explained, 
“with the exception of  Senator Helms, Senator McClure, and Mrs. Holt, 
they all felt that the ‘Saturday Night Special’ would be a legitimate ban if  it 
could be defined acceptably, and if  the ban stopped there. Most expressed 
doubt that this would happen.”73 Furthermore, Senator Goldwater, the 
staunch Conservative and former presidential candidate, “said that he was 
okay on ‘Saturday Night Specials.’ The others took the position that among 
conservatives, the gun lobby, and the gun owners, it would be perceived 
as only the first step towards a total ban on handguns.”74 Although most 
of  the Senators and Representatives accepted a ban on Saturday Night 
Specials, they almost unanimously agreed that the legislative proposal would 
decrease support for President Ford from the more conservative base of  
the Republican Party.75 
The congressmen did not stop at simple discussion of  the Saturday 
Night Specials. They also warned the counselors to the President of  the 
tangible political backlash to such a legislative move in terms of  election 
results, which was of  paramount importance to the White House staff. 
Senators McClure and Helms stressed that gun control legislation would be 
a “very volatile issue for [George] Wallace,”76 who was in the Democratic 
primary, and Dingell and Sikes made the same comment in regards to 
Reagan,77 who was running against Ford in the Republican primaries. 
Representative Dingell, a liberal but also a gun rights Democrat, further 
warned that proposed Saturday Night Specials legislation would hurt 
the President in Western and Midwestern States in the 1976 election.78 
Senator Helms reportedly said, “bye-bye Jerry,” and explained, “as far as 
the conservative right is concerned, this would be another ‘Rockefeller 
appointment.’”79 However, the congregation of  senators and representatives 
not only warned of  the conservative backlash to the possibility of  banning 
Saturday Night Specials, but also unanimously stressed that the ban “will 
not make the President any political friends in the middle and on the left 
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[because] the proposal does not go far enough to satisfy them.”80 
The congressmen also voiced their opinions in regards to the actual 
policy and took the time to make suggestions of  how the bill should be 
most properly written. Representative Dingell “stressed that [the Saturday 
Night Special Bill] should not be in the form of  amendments to the 1968 
Act [because] …the 1968 law has never really been enforced.”81 Moreover, 
the congressmen recommended including more details on the definition 
of  Saturday Night Specials as well as what constituted a bona fide dealer.82 
However, “without exception, there was strong support for the mandatory 
penalties provision in the message.”83 Regarding Senator Hruska specifically, 
Friedersdorf  explained that he “had no objection whatever to the substance 
or the merits. Ken Lazarus thinks he would prefer nothing, though this was 
not expressed today by Hruska. Hruska did, however, say ‘Looks good and 
I can support all of  it.’”84
 In mid-June 1975, President Ford began detailing his crime 
message at places such as Yale Law School and the Miami Police Chiefs 
Conference. The crime message as a whole proposed a multi-faceted 
approach to combating crime across the United States, including 
discussions related to prison reform and mental health awareness. A 
significant section of  the message detailed the President’s preferable course 
on gun control and gun crime. President Ford began this section by stating:
It is simply indisputable that handguns play a key role in 
crime in America. They are involved in one-fourth of  
aggravated assaults and one-third of  robberies. Hundreds 
of  policemen have been killed through the criminal use 
of  handguns in the past decade. These cold, undeniable 
statistics unmistakably portray the handgun as an 
important cause in the rise of  violent crime.85 
In order to combat the hike in possession of  handguns and reduce the pain 
and violence they inflicted, President Ford then proposed a four-part plan.
First, the Administration sought to address licensing issues by 
revising current laws in order to eliminate flaws that impeded licensing 
effectiveness.86 The President wanted to update licensing standards so 
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that only bona fide gun dealers could obtain one.87 Furthermore, he 
declared that dealers’ licenses “should be withheld from persons who are 
not legitimate gun dealers or who are barred by State law from dealing 
in weapons.”88 In addition, the President proposed the establishment of  
a system of  administrative fines in order “to augment existing penalties 
for violations of  law or regulation.”89 Lastly, President Ford stressed that 
possession of  a handgun by a convicted felon was a federal offense.90 
Second, President Ford’s crime message took on Saturday Night 
Specials in particular. His message stated that “the domestic manufacture, 
assembly or sale – as well as the importation of  cheap, highly concealable 
handguns” needed to be prohibited.91 He emphasized the fact that Saturday 
Night Specials were used in an extraordinarily large number of  crimes, and 
that most of  the guns had no legitimate sporting purposes.92 In concluding 
his strong stance on Saturday Night Specials, the President stated, “they 
are such a threat to domestic tranquility that we should eliminate their 
manufacture and sale entirely.”93 
Third, President Ford wanted to work towards ending the illegal 
commerce that provided a continuous flow of  handguns across state 
borders and into major cities.94 He further explained the dilemma, stating 
that federal laws “make the sale of  handguns to certain individuals illegal, 
but they do not require those in the handgun-selling business to take 
adequate precaution to ensure that illegal sales are not made.”95 Ford’s 
desired approach to this problem would require handgun dealers to verify 
the identity and the place of  residence of  purchasers and “to take steps 
to ensure that they do not sell handguns to persons whose possession of  
handguns would be illegal under Federal or State law.”96 Lastly, his proposal 
would provide more criminal sanctions for “gunrunners” who purchased 
guns in one state and illegally sold them in another.97 
Fourth, using recommendations from the Attorney General’s 
proposal, the Ford Administration sought to establish federal handgun 
strike forces in America’s ten largest cities in order to “assist local law 
enforcement authorities in their efforts to attack the illegal commerce 
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in weapons.”98 President Ford decided to direct the Bureau of  Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms to “the primary mission of  which is enforcement 
of  Federal gun laws,” in which it would train additional agents and 
investigators for this prerogative.99  
In the conclusion of  his crime message, President Ford stated, 
“the law should be specifically revised to take into greater account the 
needs of  victims of  crime: their tragic personal and economic injuries.”100 
The Ford Administration viewed current laws as too focused on the 
defendant and not on law-abiding citizens.101 In order to accomplish this 
goal, President Ford urged Congress to pass legislation that would meet the 
“uncompensated economic losses of  victims of  Federal crimes who suffer 
personal injury” by using the money the federal government received from 
fines paid by criminal offenders.102 
By late June and early July, after a long process of  consultation 
with members of  Congress, the Attorney General’s Office, the Treasury 
Department, and legal and policy experts, the Ford Administration decided 
to begin making these proposals tangible.103 The handgun bill that President 
Ford drafted planned to ban the importation, domestic manufacturing, 
and sale of  Saturday Night Specials. It also planned to restrict the issuance 
of  federal dealers’ licenses to bona fide gun dealers as well as restrict the 
sale of  multiple handguns within a thirty-day period.  Furthermore, the 
legislative plan imposed a 14-day waiting period between the purchase and 
receipt of  a handgun. During this time, the dealer could check to make sure 
the buyer could lawfully own a handgun under the applicable laws. Lastly, 
the proposed law sought to require the implementation of  a mandatory 
minimum term of  imprisonment on any person convicted of  using or 
carrying a handgun while committing a felony.104 
However, the President’s Handgun Bill did not plan to require a 
federal license to purchase a handgun or the registration of  handguns with 
the federal government. It also did not plan to prohibit law-abiding citizens 
from possessing handguns or authorize the federal government to keep 
records of  everyone who buys handguns. Lastly, the Ford proposal would 
not apply to the possession or sale of  long guns, and it would not prohibit 
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collectors from buying or selling curio or antique handguns.105  
Almost immediately, the President’s administration experienced 
backlash from conservatives for its stance on gun control. Neal Knox, 
the editor and publisher of  Handloader Rifle, began a letter he sent to Max 
Friedersdorf  on July 11, 1975, by stating, “the President is about to make 
a serious mistake, one that is certain to have detrimental effects upon 
his reelection campaign, as well as effects upon the 1976 congressional 
campaigns. I hope it is not too late to prevent it.”106 He saw President 
Ford as being “sandbagged on the gun issue by the Democratic and press 
opposition” and without advisers “wise enough to see it.”107 Knox explained 
that he saw the Saturday Night Specials as a “manufactured term and a 
manufactured issue.”108 He argued that the size requirements of  guns to be 
legal would alienate many gun owners who had handguns not large enough 
to be considered lawful.109 In conclusion, Neal Knox asked President Ford 
to reconsider his stance on the issue of  gun legislation and to take a more 
conservative stance because his current proposal would lead to either 
George Wallace or Ted Kennedy winning the Presidency.110 In response to 
the dissatisfaction towards his gun control proposal, President Ford began 
to repeatedly assure those on the political right that he was “unalterably 
opposed to Federal registration of  guns or gun owners” and that he 
proposed “that the Congress enact legislation to deal with those who use 
handguns for criminal purposes.”111
Neal Knox and the gun lobby were not the only ones to be 
against the Ford Administration’s proposal on gun legislation. On July 
25, 1975, Attorney General Edward Levi met with Senator Hruska to 
discuss his viewpoints on the President’s proposed bill.112 Senator Hruska 
was a powerful Republican Senator from Nebraska and would be needed 
for the passage of  the bill in Congress. On July 28, Jim Cannon sent a 
memorandum to Phil Buchen outlining Edward Levi’s conclusions after 
meeting with the Senator. As Buchen explained, Hruska objected to five 
main points of  the President’s bill because they were either too intrusive 
or too inconvenientfor the American people. The first objection was to the 
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“portion of  the provision prohibiting shipment ‘through’ a state or locality” 
because this would create a burden on firearms shippers who would have 
to alter their routes through states that did not have the prohibition.113 
Furthermore, the Congressman objected to the section that prohibited gun 
owners from purchasing or receiving multiple handguns within a thirty-day 
period from other owners.114 However, Senator Hruska did not object to 
the portions of  the section that prohibited dealers from transferring two 
or more handguns to the same person or any person from purchasing two 
or more handguns from one or more dealers.115 In addition, the Senator 
disagreed with the proposal to place criminal liability on gun owners.116 In 
building off  of  this reservation towards the proposed bill, Senator Hruska 
also objected to the section that made it illegal for “any person selling 
a handgun [to] knowing[ly] [sell] that handgun [if  it] has been classified 
as a Saturday Night Special.”117 The Senator again specified that he only 
meant sales between two owners, not with a licensed dealer involved.118 
Lastly, Senator Hruska took issue with the definition of  Saturday Night 
Specials, which he believed “sweeps too broadly.”119 He preferred legislation 
that would allow the “Secretary of  the Treasury to promulgate criteria 
determining which handguns should be prohibited and which should 
not.”120 After concluding his objections to the bill, Senator Hruska did not 
make it clear if  he would support the bill after these provisions had been 
changed.121 Furthermore, Attorney General Levi stated in his write-up, “I 
supposed that of  these objections, 3, 4, and 5 may raise the more serious 
policy questions.”122
The Congressional Debate over Saturday Night Special Legislation
 In the summer of  1975, the legislative proposal the Ford 
Administration drafted was introduced into both Houses of  Congress. 
Meanwhile, Democratic legislators also proposed their own legislation to 
control the sale and manufacture of  Saturday Night Specials. Despite the 
push by both political parties to implement new gun control measures, 
their lack of  support and power in Congress led to the failure of  both the 
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Democrat and Republican bills.  
Though the Ford Administration needed Senator Hruska’s support 
for the passage of  its bill, it did not wait to introduce the bill to the Senate 
on July 26, 1975.123 Senator Hiram Fong, a Republican from Hawaii and 
a member of  the Senate Judiciary Committee, sponsored the bill, S.2186, 
which was officially titled, “A bill to ban the importation, manufacture, sale, 
and transfer of  Saturday Night Specials, to improve the effectiveness of  
the Gun Control Act of  1968, to ban possession, shipment, transportation, 
and receipt of  all firearms by felons.”124 The bill did not take Senator 
Hruska’s recommendations into account and instituted all of  the provisions 
in President Ford’s original proposition. Three days later, Representative 
Robert McClory, a Republican from Illinois, sponsored the same bill, H.R. 
9022, in the House of  Representatives.125  
 Congress, however, would not act only in the President’s interest 
in regards to the debate on gun control. Representative John Conyers Jr., 
a Democrat from Michigan, introduced his own bill, H.R. 11193, officially 
known as the “Federal Firearms Act” on December 16, 1975.126 H.R. 11193 
took a somewhat similar approach to legislating Saturday Night Specials and 
firearms as the Ford Administration, but it did make several changes due to 
its Democratic position on the gun control debate.
An outline on comparisons between the Administration 
bill and Conyers’s bill explained that the Democrat bill, just like the 
Administration’s, “would require that a purchaser of  a handgun appear in 
person at the licensee’s place of  business to establish his identity and to 
fill out a sworn statement permitting a police and FBI records check to be 
conducted.”127 However, the waiting period established by the Democrat 
bill required that every purchaser of  a handgun would be subjected to a 
14-day waiting period, even if  the results from the police records were 
received earlier. The Administration bill, on the other hand, instituted a 
14-day maximum waiting period. Furthermore, under the Democrat bill, if  
results from the police records were not received, then the handgun could 
not be transferred for twenty-eight days.128 Another difference between 
the two bills arose in how they decided to evaluate imported handguns; 
the Democrat bill chose to use existing criteria proposed by the Treasury 
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while the Administration decided to use its own.129 The Democrat bill did 
modify its factoring criteria, however, “to require a minimum four-inch 
barrel for revolvers, to take into account recent developments in safety 
features and frame construction, and to incorporate much of  the technical 
language of  the Administration’s bill.”130 Finally, the Democrat bill, unlike 
the Administration’s bill, “[did] not cover private sales of  Saturday Night 
Specials and [did] not cover Saturday Night Specials manufactured before 
the effective date.”131  
In regards to the price of  licenses, both bills increased the license 
fees for manufacturers, importers, and dealers, but the Administration’s bill 
raised the fee higher than the Democrats.132 A major concern for liberals 
regarding licensing fees was that they essentially made gun ownership 
feasible only for wealthier people. The Democrat bill’s qualification 
provisions of  the license were also “less stringent than those in the 
Administration bill” as they “[did] not contain the requirement set forth 
in the Administration bill that the Secretary of  the Treasury find that the 
applicant for a license, by reason of  his business experience, financial 
standing, or trade connections, is likely to commence the business to which 
the license applies in a reasonable period of  time.”133 
 In the conclusion of  their comparison, the Democrat bill and the 
Administration bill both contained similar provisions in regards to: 
Multiple sales; mandatory minimum sentences for com-
mission of  offenses with firearms (limited in the Democrat 
bill to crimes of  violence); transfer of  a handgun to a per-
son where possession by that person would be in violation 
of  state, federal, or local law (the seller would have to 
know the possession was illegal to violate the Democrat 
bill. If  the seller did not know or have reason to believe 
the sale was legal, he would violate the Administration bill 
if  he bought the gun with the intent to resell it.134 
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However, the Democrat bill did contain provisions that were not in the 
Administration bill, such as a requirement of: 
Compliance with safety regulations for carrier 
transportation of  firearms and ammunition; [a requirement 
of] carriers and license manufacturers, importers, and 
dealers to report loss or theft of  firearms or ammunition 
in their control; and a 30-day delay in the effective date 
of  regulations under the Gun Control Act, as amended, 
to permit a House of  Congress to pass a resolution 
disapproving the regulations.135 
Lastly, the Democrat bill did not contain the provision that the 
Administration bill had, which made it a federal offense to transport 
firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce if  the 
transportation was a violation of  the law of  the place to which or through 
which the transportation occurred.136
 The NRA and other gun rights lobbying organizations were not 
pleased at all with the Democrats’ bill. The National Rifle Association 
wrote a letter to the Ford Administration in April of  1976 as Conyers’s 
bill, H.R. 11193, was again being reviewed in the House Committee on 
the Judiciary.137  The NRA declared that, “H.R. 11193 is not a ‘Saturday 
Night Special’ bill” and that “it would outlaw the future manufacture or 
importation of  so-called ‘concealable’ handguns, defined to include more 
than 50% of  all handguns now produced in the United States.”138  Gun 
control advocates opposed this because many of  these handguns were 
seen as high-quality models that were commonly purchased by law-abiding 
citizens solely for sporting and defensive purposes.139 Furthermore, the 
NRA rejected the precedent that H.R. 11193 established, which would 
allow the government to dictate which handguns were “bad,” regardless of  
“who own[ed] them and the use to which they [were] put.”140 In conclusion, 
this NRA letter to the Ford Administration saw the new handgun laws in 
Conyers’s bill, as well as the President’s bill, as stretching too far and argued 
that they would eventually create difficulty for people to be able to defend 
themselves.141 
 President Ford also began receiving personal letters from gun 
rights advocates urging him to sign more pro-gun legislation. On September 
3, 1976, Harlon B. Carter, the Executive Director of  the NRA at the time, 
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wrote to President Ford to try to convince him to sign H.R. 12261, which 
would “extend congressional authority over gun control legislation in the 
District of  Columbia for two more years.”142 Harlon Carter had feared that 
if  H.R. 12261 did not pass then partial prohibition of  handgun ownership 
in Washington, D.C., could become a reality, which would set a precedent 
in regards to further handgun legislation. Ashley Halsey Jr., the Editor-
in-Chief  of  The American Rifleman and director of  the NRA Publications 
division at the time, wrote an advocacy letter to President Ford expressing 
his similar thoughts in regards to H.R. 12261 as well.143 To both Harlon 
Carter and Ashley Halsey, President Ford wrote a similarly worded letter 
that expressed his belief  “that America’s decent citizens have had to pay far 
too much both in economic and human terms for the anti-social acts of  a 
relatively few criminals.”144  Ford stressed that in his view, the best way to 
combat violent crime in America was through mandatory sentencing and 
minimum terms of  imprisonment for anyone convicted of  using a weapon 
in the commission of  a crime.145 President Ford then thanked each person 
for writing to him and for their viewpoints and then stated, “I will oppose 
any attempt to deprive law-abiding citizens of  their traditional freedom to 
own firearms.”146
The Failure of  Legislation and its Repercussions
 On September 7, 1976, President Ford signed the NRA-backed 
H.R. 12261 into law. The law effectively doubled the amount of  time from 
twenty-four months to forty-eight months that the Council of  the District 
of  Columbia needed to wait until it could enact legislation in regards to any 
provision “relating to criminal offenses, criminal procedure, or prisoners.”147 
The NRA achieved what it lobbied for with H.R. 12261. On the other 
hand, the Administration’s bills and the Democrat bill, S. 2186, H.R. 9022, 
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and H.R. 11193, never made it out of  their respective committees.148,149,150 
Congress could not reach an agreement at this time on how it would 
address gun control, even with the President backing one of  the bills in the 
House and one in the Senate.
 Although some gun rights advocates did pledge support to 
President Ford in the 1976 election,151 it was not enough to help him win. 
In 1977, the National Rifle Association officially underwent a momentous 
shift in how it viewed gun rights as well as itself. The NRA emerged from 
this revitalizing period, known as the Revolt in Cincinnati, as the staunch, 
Second-Amendment-defending, lobbying powerhouse that it still is today.152 
In 1980, Ronald Reagan ran for the presidency with a firm stance on being 
pro-gun rights.153 He became the first presidential nominee that the NRA 
officially supported.154 
Therefore, the Ford Administration is a unique presidency to 
study in regards to gun legislation because it was the last time a Republican 
President was able and willing to approach a debate on gun control without 
having to take a fundamentally anti-gun control stance. Even Ronald 
Reagan, who survived an assassination attempt, did not announce support 
for the Brady Bill, which required background checks on people buying 
guns with mental illnesses or criminal histories, until after he left office.155 
Saturday Night Specials were such a problematic issue at the time that 
Ford’s whole senior department officials agreed on a ban on the guns. 
In only a few years time, a Republican president would not and could 
not be a proponent of  such ideas. Although the middle-of-the-road laws 
introduced by the Ford Administration as well as by Congress ultimately 
failed, they represented a time when both parties were willing to act to 
regulate gun violence. Since the failure to further legislate Saturday Night 
Specials, the United States has witnessed an unprecedented growth in the 
power of  the gun lobby, a revisionist approach to understanding the Second 
Amendment, and presidents who have taken a strong stance against further 
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gun legislation.156 Furthermore, in 2008, in District of  Columbia vs. Heller, the 
Supreme Court officially ruled that the Second Amendment does invoke 
the right of  individuals to possess firearms. The 1968 Gun Control Act 
set into motion the possibility of  curbing violent crime committed with 
firearms. The Saturday Night Specials bills that were proposed by President 
Ford and Congress during his tenure in the White House could have further 
strengthened the government’s ability to end gun violence. Instead, the 
failures of  the federal government at this time altered the course of  the 
debate over gun control, which has repercussions to this day. 
156 Waldman, The Second Amendment, 96-102.
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